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AGAINST PRACTICE
A nthony V. A lfieri *
E DUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF

LAW. By

William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welsh Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S.
Shulman. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007. Pp. x, 225 . $40.
"[T]he challenge of professional preparation for the law [is] linking the in
terests of educators with the needs of practitioners and the members of the
public the profession is pledged to serve-in other words, participating in
civic professionalism" (p. 4).
I NTRODUCTION

Legal education is against practice. More than a half century after
1
Jerome Frank's call for a clinical-lawyer school, and nearly two decades
2
after the MacCrate Commission's plea for professional development, many
American law schools continue to privilege theory over practice in teaching,
scholarship, and institutional mission. In teaching, law schools elevate for
mal knowledge and case-dialogue pedagogy over practical judgment and
policy analysis. In scholarship, law schools favor doctrinal synthesis and
critique over field-based research on "law in action." And in mission, law
schools promote a self-regarding vision of lawyer-guild professionalism,
role differentiation, and dyadic adversarial conflict over civic professional
ism, role integration, and community-based social justice.
The animus of theory-centered traditions toward practice obscures the
interdisciplinary breadth, empirical richness, and moral import of lawyer
roles and relationships. The same animus reduces professionalism to a
largely aspirational function sounded in tropes to alumni, students, and the
*
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Patrick Gudridge, JoNel Newman, Bernie Perlmutter, Stephen Urice, Frank Valdes, Kele Williams,
and the participants in Yale Law School's Conference on Frontiers in Social Justice Lawyer
ing: Critical Race Revisited.
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I . See Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1 303 ( 1 947); Jerome Frank,
Why Not a Clinical Wl>)'er-School?, 8 1 U. PA. L. REv. 907 ( 1 933).

2. See THE MACCRATE REPORT (Joan S. Howland & William H. Lindberg eds 1 994) ;
TASK FORCE ON LAW SCH. & THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR Ass' N, LEGAL EDUCATION A N D
PROFESSION A L DEVE LOPMENT ( 1 992 ) . More recently, see R O Y STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRAC
TICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007).
. •

1073

1074

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 107: 1 073

bar. The results of this animus reinforce conventional roles and relationships
among lawyers, clients, and communities; fortify the socioeconomic ine
qualities of entrenched civil and criminal justice systems; and preserve the
disparate treatment suffered by women and minorities in the legal services
marketplace. Acquiescence to role convention and sociolegal inequality di
minishes the curricular importance of professional development
opportunities and programmatic social justice initiatives. Absent a meaning
ful commitment to professional development and social justice in the law
school curriculum, institutional mission succumbs to the reigning orthodox
ies of the adversary system and the ethics of the legal marketplace. 3
The theory/practice dichotomy in law school teaching, scholarship, and
mission relegates clinical-lawyer instruction to the periphery of legal educa
tion and consigns clinical faculty to a subordinate caste status differentiated
by inferior compensation, limited governance, and segregated space.4 De
spite this academic caste hierarchy, an increasing number of law schools
have made progress in integrating clinical-lawyer perspectives into their
5
pedagogies, scholarship, and curricular missions. Indeed, numerous schools
at all tiers now embrace policy-oriented, problem-solving methods of peda
gogy; recognize interdisciplinary, practice-based scholarship; and
incorporate "lawyering" skills courses into the traditional core curriculum.
Paradoxically, by carving pedagogies of practice out of positivist norms of
neutrality and scientific technique, and individualist norms of liberal legal
ism, law schools have fashioned a new formalism severed from difference
based identity, context, and community. Pedagogies of practice common to
both clinics and skills courses point to the rise of this new formalism in
claims of neutral lawyer judgment, technical "lawyering" process values,
and client-centered representation indifferent to the other-regarding interests
of community building. 6
3. See LANI GUINIER ET AL, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTI
TUTIONAL CHANGE (1997); MILTON c. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL
STREET LAWYER (2004); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal
Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 5 1 5 (2007).
4. See pp. 92-93. Broadly defined, clinical educators include instructors supervising in
house clinics and extemships, or teaching "lawyering" skills simulation courses. Elliott S. Milstein,
Clinical Legal Education in the United States: In-House Clinics, Extemships, and Simulations, 5 1 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 375, 375-76 (2001 ) . On disparities in clinical faculty compensation and governance,
see CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUC., REPORT ON THE 2007-2008 SURVEY 3 1 (2008),
available at http://www.csale.org/CSALE.07-08.Survey.Report.pdf (reporting on clinical faculty
members' voting rights and ability to participate in law school committees); Taskforce on Clinicians
& the Acad., Am. Ass'n of Law Sch. Section on Clinical Educ., Draft Statement of Fundamental
Principles 2, 6, 8-10 (Apr. 30, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing unequal governance rights and
inferior compensation and resources). The Draft Statement of Fundamental Principles cites the
"caste system" perpetuated by the unequal status of clinical educators in law school institutional
governance and "its stigmatizing impact" within the law school faculty. See Taskforce on Clinicians
& the Acad., supra, at 9.
5. Jill Schachner Chanen, Re-Engineering the JD: Schools Across the Country Are Teaching
Less About the Law and More About lawyering, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 42; Jonathan D. Glater,
Training Law Studentsfor Real-Life Careers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3 1 , 2007, at B9.
6. In-house clinics attempt to resist this tendency by addressing client identity and commu
nity in multidimensional contexts replete with emotional, narrative, spatial, and symbolic
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This Review examines the theory/practice dichotomy in legal education
7
through the prism of the Carnegie Foundation's Educating Lawyers:
Preparation for the Profession of Law. Descriptively, it argues that the
Foundation's investigation of law school curricular deficiencies in the areas
of clinical-lawyer skills, professionalism, and public service overlooks the
relevance of critical pedagogies in teaching students how to deal with differ
ence-based identity and how to build cross-cultural community in diverse,
multicultural practice settings differentiated by mutable and immutable
characteristics such as class, gender, and race. Prescriptively, it argues that
the Foundation's remedial call for the curricular integration of clinical
lawyer practices similarly overlooks the utility of critical pedagogies in
teaching students not only how to understand difference, but also how to
represent difference-based clients and communities here and abroad.
The Review is divided into two parts. Part I explores the Carnegie Foun
dation's assessment of law schools in preparing students through
contemporary case dialogue and in integrating alternative-practice pedago
gies. Part II analyzes the ramifications of the Foundation's report for the
application of alternative curricular frameworks, particularly critical peda
gogies grounded in difference-based identity and community. These
frameworks are briefly sketched in a study of the West Coconut Grove His
toric Black Church project at the University of Miami Law School's
Community Economic Development and Design ("CEDAD") Clinic. The
case study demonstrates both the difficulty and the necessity of developing
theory/practice pedagogies effective in dealing with difference-based iden
tity in the context of representing communities of color.
I. (M1s)EDUCATING LAWYERS: THE CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION CRITIQUE

The Carnegie Foundation's critique offers an abridged cultural and so
cial history of legal education predicated on the vision of law as a "public
profession" and of lawyers as agents charged with "important public re
sponsibilities" (p. 1). The critique gleans this sociocultural history from a
cross-section of sixteen law schools of varying tiers surveyed during the
1 999-2000 academic year. The Foundation views the preparation of lawyers
in law school as "the crucial portal to the practice of law" (p. 1 ), illuminat
ing "the daily practices of teaching and learning through which future legal
professionals are formed" (pp. 1-2).
To better understand legal education and its implications for the profes
sion, the Foundation focuses on " how learning occurs" in law and in other
professions such as medicine (pp. 2, 192-94). Focusing on how law school
complexity. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in Community: Representing "Colored Town ", 95 CAL. L.
REV. 1 829 (2007).
7.
William Sullivan is a Senior Scholar at The Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of
Teaching; Anne Colby is Co-Director of The Carnegie Foundation's Preparation for the Professions
Program; Judith Wegner is a Senior Scholar at The Carnegie Foundation; Lloyd Bond is a Senior
Scholar at The Carnegie Foundation; Lee Schulman is President of The Carnegie Foundation.
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"forms minds and shapes identities," it links the common aim of all profes
sional education to the cultivation of specialized knowledge and
professional identity (p. 2). Next it highlights the "modes of teaching and
learning" that law schools use to accomplish that common aim (p. 3). Two
modes of teaching and learning stand central to this analysis-the classroom
8
experience of Socratic case dialogue and the clinical experience of lawyer
9
apprenticeship. Both modes of pedagogy contribute to the development of
10
legal understanding and the formation of professional identity. Yet, both
produce different and often inconsonant sets of legal skills and professional
norms. That dissonance, echoed throughout the law school experience, chal
lenges the Foundation to search the history of legal education for means of
pedagogical reconciliation and curricular integration.
A. The Evolution of Case-Dialogue Pedagogy
The Carnegie Foundation traces the current dissonance in the profes
sional enterprise of legal education to the evolution of the modern law
school as a contested, hybrid institution (pp. 4-5, 78-82). This evolution
displays a historic tension between the conventions of the practitioner com
munity and the canons of the modern research university. From the
practitioner community, law schools derive traditions of craft, judgment, and
public responsibility. From the research university, law schools deduce ide
als of knowledge, reason, and truth-academic ideals that emphasize
objective, quantitative measurement and formal knowledge abstracted from
the daily context of practice (p. 5). Akin to philosophical positivism, this
widely adopted academic epistemology heralds the value of importing "sci
entifically generated" forms of knowledge as "technical instruments for
managing events in more rational ways" (p. 5). Legal positivists grasp "law
as an instrument of rational policymaking-a set of rules and techniques
rather than a craft of interpretation and adaptation embedded in the common
law" (p. 5). This institutional seizure of scientific methodology and techni
cal rationality, the Foundation shows, "undermined the academic legitimacy
of practical knowledge" in legal education (p. 5).
To the Carnegie Foundation, the waning legitimacy of practical knowl
edge under positivist legal theory stemmed from a failure to blend academic

8. On the reformist backdrop of the case-dialogue method, see Bruce A. Kimball, Young
Christopher Langdell, 1826-1854: The Formation of an Educational Reformer, 52 J. LEGAL Eouc.
1 89 (2002). See also David D. Gamer, The Continuing Vitality of the Case Method in the Twenty
First Century, 2000 BYU Eouc. & L.J. 307.
9. On the curricular adaptations of the apprentice system, see James E. Moliterno, An
Analysis of £1hics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Los/ Benefi1s of the Apprenlice System in The
Academic Atmosphere. 60 U. CiN. L. REV. 83 ( 1 99 1 ).
10. The Carnegie Foundation observes: "Professional schools are not only where expen
knowledge and judgment are communicated from advanced practitioner to beginner; they are also
the place where the profession puts its defining values and exemplars on display, where future prac
titioners can begin both to assume and critically examine their future identities." P. 4.
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and practitioner traditions of legal training in "reciprocal enrichment." 1 1 That
failure breached the legal profession's "contract with society" (p. 2 1 ) . Re
pairing this breach and restoring public trust requires academic/practitioner
goal integration, a reappraisal of signature pedagogies, and a recovery of
professionalism (pp. 2 1-33). For the Foundation, the opportunity to trans
form legal education springs from the potential union of innovative practice
pedagogies, professional norms, and case-dialogue traditions (pp. 33-43).

The predominance of case-dialogue pedagogy in law schools signals the

triumph of formal knowledge and scientific rationality in legal analysis (pp.
5-7). Marked by the ascendance of university-housed academic specialists, 1 2
the rise of an abstract j urisprudence of "general ideas and principles" in
American law produced a new legal scholarship of doctrinal synthesis and a
new method of training in legal knowledge "separate from learning to prac
tice" (pp. 5-6). The new scholarship assimilated the model of formal,
scientific discourse, engrafting it on constitutional, statutory, and common
law materials (pp. 5-7). Assimilation resulted in the shifting of academic
research norms away from practice contexts toward an emulation of the arts
and-sciences disciplines (pp. 1 1 - 1 2). The new methodology likewise favored
legal knowledge and reasoning over practice skills/ 3 deferring practice ex

perience until postgraduate entry into the profession . 1 4 Preference for formal
knowledge and objectivity helped rationalize the legal process, the Founda

tion concedes, but worked to diminish the relationship of legal education to
morality and public responsibility (p. 7). The consequent "loss of orientation
and meaning" among faculty and students reveals the "shadow side" of
modern legal education and fuels recurrent accusations of professional self
absorption and public irresponsibility (p. 7).
For the Carnegie Foundation, case dialogue symbolizes legal education's

signature pedagogy. 1 5 The reliance of the case-dialogue method on the in
class tactics and dynamics of the Socratic process fu rnishes students cogni

tive instruction in the realist task of fitting rules to contextually unmoored
facts. 16 According to the Foundation, the Socratic process affords flexibility

1 1 . P. 5; see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 9 1 MICH. L. REV. 34 ( 1 992).
1 2. See John S. Elson, Why and How the Practicing Bar Must Rescue American Legal Edu
cation from the Misguided Priorities of American Legal Academia, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1 1 35, 1 1 3536, 1 1 38-39 ( 1 997); Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the Millennium: The Law School, the
Research University and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 Omo ST. L J. 1 965,
1 968-78 ( 1 999).
.

1 3. See generally ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO
"THINK LIKE A LAWYER" (2007).
1 4. The need to teach new associates law-office management exemplifies such misplaced
deferment. See Debra Moss Curtis, Teaching Law Office Management: Why Law Studellls Need to
Know the Business of Being a Lawyer, 7 1 ALB. L. REv. 201 (2008).
1 5. Pp. 47-50; see also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell 's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. I
( 1 983); Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell 's Method, and What to Do About it, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 609 (2007).
1 6. See Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist
Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REv. 483, 494-508 (2007).
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in adjusting case dialogue and exposes indeterminacy in the application of
rules (pp. 47-50). To a more limited extent, it also expands the interpretative
and policy repertoire of students. Nonetheless, the Foundation contends that
the case-dialogue method generates diminishing returns, particularly when
17
extended beyond the first-year classroom. This decline in pedagogical effi
18
cacy is not seen elsewhere in professional education, for example in
medical school, where a continuum of theory/practice integration holds cur
19
ricular sway. To correct the curricular overreliance on case-dialogue
methods in law school, and to counter the ethical relativism and nihilism
20
that may ensue, the Foundation considers alternative methods of practice
based instruction that enhance the formative, identity-making dimension of
legal education.
B. The Tum to Practice: Clinical Programs and

"Lawyering " Courses
The Foundation's turn toward practice integration borrows from appren
tice traditions and the cognitive sciences. Earlier invoked in the MacCrate
report, apprentice traditions help to overcome the trade school stigma often
21
associated with practice pedagogies. Bolstered by advances in the cogni
22
tive study of learning, the traditions now give greater meaning to the
formation of professional expertise (pp. 95-100). The apprentice model of
practice supplies cognitive techniques and operating procedures to enrich
legal knowledge and professional effectiveness. Those techniques include
case and composition theory, legal writing, skill simulation, and negotiation
(pp. 1 02-13). Case theory in particular affords students an opportunity to
move from novice experimentation to expert practice and, ultimately, to

17. Pp. 75-78; see also Mitu Gulati et al., The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination
of the Third Year of Law School, 5 1 J. LEGAL Eouc. 235 (200 I).
18. For empirical research on pedagogical efficacy, see Stefan H. Krieger, The Development
ofLegal Reasoning Skills in Law Students: An Empirical Study, 56 J. LEGAL Eouc. 332 (2006).
19. Pp. 59-84; see also Andrew J. Rothman, Preparing Law School Graduates for Practice:
A Blueprint for Professional Education Following the Medical Profession Example, 5 1 RUTGERS L.
REV. 875 ( 1 999); cf Molly Cook et al., American Medical Education JOO Years after the Flexner
Report, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 339 (2006).
20. On ethical relativism and nihilism in legal education, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Denaturalizing the Lawyer-Statesman, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 204 ( 1 995) (book review).
2 1 . Pp. 9 1 -93. For sympathetic accounts of the MacCrate report, see Russell Engler, The
MacCrate Report Ttlms JO: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8
CLINICAL L. REV. 1 09 (200 1 ), and Peter A. Joy, The MacCrate Report: Moving Toward Integrated
Leaming Experiences, I CLINICAL L. REV. 401 ( 1 994).
22. See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and
the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3 1 3, 329-32 ( 1995); Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Law
yers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL Eouc. 57, 60 ( 1 992).
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formal knowledge. This process fosters the exercise of judgment in context
23
and builds professional identity and purpose.
To surmount the positivist ethos of the research university, the Founda
tion recommends practice pedagogies that unite the disparate parts of legal
education by reconnecting craft with formal knowledge. It locates this unity
in an alternative conception of craft-informed knowledge animating the
work of engaged practitioners in clinical, "lawyering" skills, and legal writ
ing courses. For this practitioner community, "law is a tradition of social
practice that includes particular habits of mind, as well as a distinctive ethi
cal engagement with the world" (p. 8). Understanding law as a practice
tradition tied to cognitive development, skill, and social interaction redefines
legal education as a practical discipline. To the Foundation, "the practical
disciplines embody forms of knowing that blur distinctions among cogni
tion, action, and intention" (p. 8). Learning to apply these forms of knowing
requires the teaching of practical judgment.
The Carnegie Foundation defines practical judgment in terms of "the
ability to both act and think well in uncertain situations" (p. 9). On this
definition, judgment is in part a function of professional expertise. The skill
ful application of professional judgment "means involvement in situations
that are necessarily indeterminate from the point of view of formal knowl
edge" (p. 8). The Foundation explicitly aims to enhance professional
judgment through critical analysis. This craft-guided critical analysis treats
professional practice as an instance of "judgment in action" (p. 9). In order
"to make practice more effective, comprehensible to students, and open to
critical assessment" (p. 9), the Foundation notes, analysis demands reflec
tion.
Clinical education satisfies this demand by providing contexts in which
students "observe, simulate, attempt, and then critically reflect on their
work" (p. 9). The clinical case conference and practicum employed in the
CEDAD Clinic's Historic Black Church project, for example, provide con
texts in which students assess community-based practice situations,
critically reflect on church-client and community needs, and reach collabo
rative judgments about remedial legal, political, and social solutions.
Indeed, the clinical pedagogy of participatory analysis, critique, and reflec
tion enables CEDAD students to broaden their perception of faith-based
racial identity and deepen their appreciation for black church ministries and
congregations, thus enlarging their professional repertoires of experience
and judgment. Experiential learning of this sort revives the normative pur
poses of the profession (p. 10).
The Carnegie Foundation's endorsement of the application of theoretical
work to the domain of practice generates alternative pedagogies and analytic
frameworks culled from the interpretation of client and community contexts
and case narratives. Unsurprisingly, the narratives reveal "much more being

23. See pp. 1 1 1 -25. The Foundation argues that "case theory calls attention to the important
role played by the problems of particular clients in specific situations in giving impetus to the legal
process." P. 1 24.
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taught and learned in any pedagogical situation than can be consciously ab
stracted in the form of procedures or techniques" (p. 1 1 ). The lessons of
client and community narrative carry moral consequences for legal relation
24
ships, political alliances, and social activities, faith-based and otherwise. A
decisive dimension of a lawyer's multiple roles and relationships "is respon
sibility for clients and for the values the public has entrusted to the
profession" (p. 12). Basic to legal knowledge, that responsibility drives the
25
increased curricular integration of "lawyering" skills courses.
C. Professional Reformation
The Carnegie Foundation's integrated model of legal education com
bines "conceptual knowledge, skill, and moral discernment" with the
capacity for situated judgment (p. 1 2). Bridging the gap between analytical
and practical knowledge and revitalizing professional integrity hinge on ( 1 )
extending the field of legal knowledge and (2) honing the moral capacity for
26
good judgment acquired by students in clinical settings, such as the
CEDAD Clinic's Historic Black Church project. The mutual enlargement of
theoretical and practical legal knowledge, the Foundation maintains, "will
progress best when it is directed by a focus on the professional formation of
law students" (p. 13).
1 . Curricular Integration
The Carnegie Foundation's vision of integrity-promoting purposive edu
cation rests on the curricular integration of legal analysis, practical skill, and
professional identity (pp. 1 9 1-202). Legal analysis, the Foundation ob
serves, serves as "the prior condition for practice because it supplies the
essential background assumptions and rules for engaging with the world
through the medium of the law" (p. 1 3). Practical-skills training requires
introduction to the cognitive perspective of practice and, moreover, immer
27
sion in the development of advocacy and counseling methods. Professional
28
identity uses professionalism, social responsibility, and ethics as the cata
lysts for an integrated legal education. To merge legal analysis and practical

24. On the normative lessons of narrative, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty
Law Practice: Leaming Lessons of Client Narrative, IOO YALE L.J. 2 1 07 ( 199 1 ). See generally
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 1 1 0-42 (2000).
25. Pp. 1 1 - 1 2. The Carnegie Foundation defines "lawyering" courses to include legal writing
instruction, simulated practicums, and in-house clinics. P. 1 7 . See generally Arturo Lopez Torres,
MacCrate Goes to Law School: An Annotated Bibliography of Methods for Teaching Lawyering
Skills in the Classroom, 77 NEB. L. REV. 132 ( 1 998).
26.

See p. 1 3.

27. The practical skill of intervention in advising and counseling clients grows through mod
eling, habituation, experiment, and reflection. Both simulated and clinical forms of modeling dictate
pedagogies blending formal legal analysis, practical habits of mind, and skills of social interaction.
28. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Lost Opportunity: Legal Education and the Developmelll of
Professional /delllity, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 555 (2007).
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skills in a significant way, the Foundation insists, "professionalism needs to
29
become more explicit and better diffused throughout legal preparation."
The Carnegie Foundation's framework for a more integrated approach to
legal education recognizes that reliance on law school case-dialogue peda
gogy for the purposes of professional socialization produces adverse,
unintended consequences (pp. 1 85-88). Chief among those consequences is
the neglect of practical judgment, lawyering skill, and professional identity.
To mitigate such widespread neglect, the Foundation proposes comprehen
Jo
sive change to the first-year and upper-level curricula. Borrowing from
business and medical school education, it urges continuity and innovation in
case-teaching methodology in the classroom and in the field (pp. 1 97-200).
Innovation requires not only leadership and vision, but also learning-based
J1
assessment procedures appropriate to case pedagogies. By design, assess
ment procedures measure both conceptual knowledge and competence.
Measures of conceptual knowledge rest on traditional standards of evalua
tion inside the classroom. Measures of competence, by contrast, require
alternative criterion-referenced appraisals of "lawyering" skills and ethical
social development outside the classroom (pp. 1 64-80). The appraisal of
classroom and fieldwork performance, the Foundation points out, depends
on an institutional climate of reform and intentionality (pp. 1 80-84).
2. Professional Identity and Purpose
To the Carnegie Foundation, "the formation of competent and commit
ted professionals deserves and needs to be the common, unifying purpose"
of legal education (p. 1 3). This mission gives "renewed prominence to the
ideals and commitments that have historically defined the legal profession in
America" (p. 1 3). Renewing the ideals and commitments of the profession
depends on communication and reciprocal learning among faculty and stu
dents through curricular reorganization and innovative pedagogy.
Reorganization moves legal ethics and professionalism to the center of the

29. P. 1 4; see also Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Teaching a Professional Responsibility Course:
Lessons Learned from the Clinic, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 1 49, 1 52-54 (2002) (describing a situation
where professionalism would have resolved a clinic dispute).
30. Pp. 1 94-200; see also Michael A. Millemann & Steven D. Schwinn, Teaching legal
Research and Writing with Actual Legal Work: Extending Clinical Education into the First Year, 1 2
CLINICAL L . REV. 44 1 , 476-99 (2006); Margaret M. Russell, Beginner's Resolve: A n Essay on Col
laboration, Clinical Innovation, and the First-Year Core Curriculum, I CLINICAL L. REv. 1 35, 1 4756 ( 1 994).
3 1 . Pp. 1 88-92; see E. Tammy Kim, Who 's Leaming What? Toward a participatory legal
pedagogy, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 633, 635-37 (2008) (arguing that proper leadership from
students, faculty, and law school administration may help the enterprise of legal education "move
one step closer to ensuring that the legal profession represents and responds to the needs of the
entire citizenry"); Clifford S. Zimmerman, " Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation ": Reflections
on Collaborative and Cooperative Leaming Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 3 1 Aruz. ST.
L.J. 957, 97 1 -86 ( 1 999). Zimmerman expresses "concern about the framework for evaluation of
teaching methods." Id. at 97 1 .
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32
curriculum. Innovation incorporates ethics and professionalism instruction
throughout the curriculum.
Research on education and moral development underscores the impor
33
tance of the pervasive method of legal ethics instruction. That method
treats legal professionalism as an ideal, a practice, and a means of social
contribution. An ethically sensitive apprenticeship model correlates profes
34
sional identity with the public value of "doing justice." When ethical-social
values pervade the apprenticeship process, professional identity and purpose
gain a greater sense of responsibility, seen for example in the expanding
commitment of the CEDAD Clinic's students in West Coconut Grove where
attendance at evening church meetings and Sunday services has become
routine. Enhanced responsibility augments the presence of moral-legal dia
logue in law school and the potential for pro bono work, demonstrated for
example in the cooperative development of a lawyer referral network jointly
administered by the CEDAD Clinic's students in West Coconut Grove and
black lawyers volunteering under the auspices of Miami's Wilkie D. Fergu
son Jr. B ar Association.
Pervasive professional responsibility dialogue links the "lawyering"
roles of advocacy and service. It also unifies the cognitive, practical, and
ethical-social dimensions of the apprenticeship process around the focal
35
point of competence. That process installs a continuum of teaching, learn
ing, and modeling positive professional ideals across first-year and upper
level experiences. Engaging professional ideals in core courses, "lawyering"
practicums, and legal clinics demonstrates the possibility of purposive legal
education (pp. 145-6 1).
II. (RE)EDUCATING LAWYERS: ALTERNATIVE
THEORY/PRACTICE PEDAGOGIES

The Carnegie Foundation's model of educational reform falters in
slighting the integration of critical pedagogies in formal legal analysis,
practical-skills training, and professional-identity building. Descriptively
the model overlooks alternative theoretical frameworks and practice peda
gogies acknowledging difference-based identity, context, and community.
Prescriptively the model omits remedial strategies aimed at integrating

32. See Russell G. Pearce, Teachi11g Legal Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most lmpor
ta/l/ Subject i11 law School, 29 Lov. U. Cm. L.J. 7 1 9, 735-39 ( 1 998); Deborah L. Rhode, Teachi11g
Legal Ethics, 5 1 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 043, 1 05 1-57 (2007).
33. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3 1 , 50-56
( 1 992); Alan M. Weinberger, Some Further Observations on Usi11g the Pervasive Method of Teach
ing Ethics in Property Courses, 5 1 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 203 (2007).
34. See Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How law School Disappoims law Students, the
Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 2 1 9, 248-55 (2007); Deborah L. Rhode, Legal
Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34 IND. L. REV. 23, 38-45 (2000) .
35. See Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, law Schools and the Constructio11 of Compe
tence, 43 J. LEGAL Eouc. 469 ( 1 993) (pointing out that law schools "construct competence" and
change notions of competence).
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difference-based identity, context, and community into law school peda
gogy inside and outside the classroom. Reforming law school and
reeducating the legal profession require a fuller description of the role of
identity and community in "lawyering" and a bolder prescription for their
pedagogical and practical integration. Many of these pedagogies are embed
ded in clinical education and legal education more generally yet remain
isolated and segregated from the broader curriculum. Exhibited in clinical
and hybrid outreach programs to minority racial groups and subordinate
cultures, the pedagogies demand alternative academic and experiential train
36
ing regimens for students emphasizing civic leadership.
A. Critical Pedagogies in Legal Education
Critical pedagogies extend the modem traditions of liberal legalism, par
ticularly their condemnation of ascribed caste or status hierarchies, and
embrace the postmod�rn contingencies of racial and cultural identity. Affirma
tion links liberal legalism and postmodern contingency in a shared
commitment to difference-based identity and antisubordination practice
norms. These norms guide interdisciplinary, community-based collaborations
employed in representing historically stigmatized groups encountered in
Miami's West Coconut Grove and elsewhere. The Carnegie Foundation ig
nores such alternative norms and their critical frameworks.
The Foundation's disregard of alternative norms and frameworks in for
mulating its model of educational reform inhibits the comprehensive
transformation of practice pedagogies tied to legal analysis, "lawyering"
skills, and professional identity. Pedagogical transformation requires closer
attention to identity, context, and community in everyday practice, espe
cially in dealing with minority racial groups and subordinate cultures.
Critical pedagogies prove useful to representing historically stigmatized
groups not only in condemning ascribed caste or status hierarchies, but also
in understanding the complexity of racial and cultural identity, especially
faith-based identity in individual, group, and institutional settings. Both lib
eral legalism and postmodern contingency aid this revision by challenging
neutral pedagogical perspectives and engendering practical cross-cultural
collaborations.
A transformative commitment to difference-based identity and antisub
ordination practice norms commands the abandonment of neutrality claims
37
in rendering lawyer judgments about the means and ends of representation.
The Carnegie Foundation's stance of neutrality, entrenched in the MacCrate

36. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL Eouc. 596 (2006) (urging
law school graduates to aspire to be leaders as well as counselors); Donald J. Polden, Educating
Law St11delllsfor Leadership Roles and Responsibilities, 39 U. ToL. L. REV. 353 (2008) (same).
37. The stance of neutrality combines elements of scientific rationality and doctrinal analy
sis. See Barry Friedman, Nelltral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503 ( 1 997); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Ne11tral Principles ofC011stitutio11al Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I , 1 0-20 ( 1 959).
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38
report, tolerates the use of stereotype and stigma in the "lawyering" proc
ess. Difference-based stereotype and stigma based on race, gender, or
sexuality deforms the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral content of advo
cacy. The classically liberal purpose of client-centered "lawyering" fails to
39
cure stereotypes of client or group difference. Without cross-cultural and
difference-based identity analysis, client-centered methods perpetuate
stigma-induced marginalization in law and society. Suffused in neutrality,
these methods seldom call for the contextual reassessment of client and
community identity. However, only that reassessment will alter lawyer per
ception and interpretation of client difference, and facilitate lawyer-client as
0
well as lawyer-community interaction across differences.4 Reassessment
entails lawyer introspection, cultural self-awareness, and cross-cultural
1
skills. 4
Client-collaborative reassessment confronts stereotypes that impute
marginalizing traits or behaviors to communities of color inside and outside
42
their church congregations. Confronting stereotypes through cross-cultural
collaboration involves the identification of segregating differences, the ex
ploration of multiple explanations for client behavior, and the elimination or
3
mitigation of lawyer bias.4 Although the depth of lawyer bias and the force
of color-blind neutrality hinder such identification and explanation, collabo38. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What 's Miss
ing from the MacCrate Repon-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L.
REv. 593, 593 ( 1 994) ("[The MacCrate Report] enacts a particular picture of the lawyer, as princi
pally a litigator, a 'means-ends' thinker who maximizes an abstracted client's goals."); Bumele V.
Powell, Somewhere Farther Down the Line: MacCrate 011 Multiculturalism and the Information
Age, 69 WASH. L. REV. 637 ( 1 994).
39. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client
Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006) (examining the history, development,
and theory of the client-centered approach to lawyering); Laurie Shanks, Whose Story ls It, Any
way ?-Guiding Students to Client-Centered Interviewing Through Storytelling, 14 CLINICAL L.
REV. 509 (2008).
40. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: lessons From Cognitive Social Psy
chology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1 24 1 , 1 266-8 l (2002); Ian Weinstein, Don 't Believe Everything You
Think: Cognitive Bias in legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783 (2003). Blasi noted that
"it is unlikely that . . . [there will be] long-lasting or widespread reductions in prejudice, so long
as we leave unchanged the institutional and social structures that facilitate the perpetuation of
stereotypes and the resulting discrimination, unintended and otherwise." Blasi, supra, at 1 266.
See also Lorraine Bannai & Anne Enquist, (Un)Examined Assumptions and (Un)lntended Mes
sages: Teaching Students to Recognize Bias in legal Analysis and Language, 27 S EATTLE U. L.
REV. l , 3 (2003) (asserting that law schools should teach students to recognize cultural bias because
such bias could be based on "untruths, stereotyping, or a simple lack of respect for differences").
4 1 . See Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural
Self-Awareness, 1 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005); see also David Dominguez, Beyond "Zero-Sum
Games: Multiculturalism as Enriched Law Training for All Students, 44 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1 75, 1 78
( 1 994) (promoting a "negotiable learning" model where students work closely to negotiate key
decisions which provides opportunities "to reconcile divergent cultural interests, value judgments,
and priorities").
42. See Michelle S. Jacobs, People From The Foomotes: The Missing Element in Client
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 40 1 - 1 1 ( 1 997).
43. See Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8
CLINICAL L. REv. 33, 64-67 (200 1 ); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across
Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373 (2002).
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ratively enlarging the scope of client participation in the "lawyering" proc
ess through individual decision making and collective action transforms
44
Further, it sometimes expands client and community

practical judgment.

problem solving beyond case-specific needs to encompass issue-focused,
4
neighborhood-wide campaigns, 5 thereby motivating broader affinity groups
to participate in democracy-enforcing legal-political advocacy about com
6
monly shared grievances such as crime, fair housing, and municipal equity. 4

B. Critical Pedagogies in the Classroom
The Carnegie Foundation's neglect of critical norms and frameworks in
designing its model of educational reform hampers the comprehensive trans
formation of classroom pedagogies fastened to legal analysis, "lawyering"
4
skills, and professional identity. To be inclusive and wide-ranging, 7
pedagogical transformation requires the classroom infusion of multiple
identity narratives, layered contextual descriptions, and silenced commu
nity histories . 48 The contextual exploration of client narrative and
community history in parsing stories of dominant/subordinate group com
petition and sociocultural conflict emerges out of a mixture of classical
liberal and critical-outsider j urisprudence coupled with interdisciplinary
investigation. 49 Liberal j urisprudence gives voice to authentic self

elaboration, individual liberty, and collective equality. Critical jurispru

dence reveals caste status, class subordination, and the stigmas of race,
gender, and sexuality. 50 Interdisciplinary investigation discloses ethno
graphic, psychological, and sociological insight.

Tailored to both clinical and nonclinical classrooms, mixed j urispruden
tial and interdisciplinary pedagogies of practice illuminate the cognitive,
affective, and normative elements of legal roles and relationships in guiding

44. See Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV.
427, 486-5 1 5 (2000); Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative lawyering, 1 2
CLINICAL L . REV. 541, 589-6 1 1 (2006).
45. See Gerald P. L6pez, Keynote Address, Living and lawyering Rebelliously, 73 FORD
HAM L. REV. 204 1 , 2049 (2005); Gerald P. L6pez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around
Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2004).
46. See Lucie White, "Democracy" in Development Practice: Essays on a Fugitive Theme,
64 TENN. L. REV. 1073 ( 1 997).
47. See Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8
LA RAZA L.J. 1 40 ( 1 995); Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices
Helps All Students learn, 48 J. LEGAL Eouc. 402 ( 1 998).
48. Compare DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLJENT
CENTERED A PPROACH ( 1 99 1 ), with Jacobs, supra note 42, at 346 (observing that the client-lawyer
models employed by clinical programs "fail to address . . . the effects of race, class and, to a lesser
extent, gender").
49. See Susan Bryant & Elliott S. Milstein, Rounds: A "Signature Pedagogy" for Clinical
Education?, 1 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 1 95 (2007).
50. See Russell G. Pearce, White lawyering: Rethinking Race, lawyer Identity, and Rule of
law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 208 1 , 2093-99 (2005); David B . Wilkins, Essay, Identities and Roles:
Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1 502 ( 1 998).
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51
lawyer, client, and community decision-making. Built on learning the
54
52
53
ory, those elements comprise intuition, empathy, and emotional
55
intelligence. Each of these behavioral elements is relevant to practice and
56
57
professionalism training in "lawyering" courses, simulations, extern
58
59
ships, and university-wide, cross-disciplinary clinical settings.
Joining jurisprudential and interdisciplinary classroom pedagogies also
elucidates the values and techniques of ethical discretion and moral decision
6()
making in the "lawyering" process. Among the historic black ministries of
61
62
West Coconut Grove, the calls for moral education, theology, spiritual-

5 1 . See generally THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A
HEALING PROFESSION (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin,
"Johnny 's in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine ": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical
Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339 (2000).
52. See Robin A. Boyle & Rita Dunn, Teaching Law Students Through Individual Learning
Styles, 62 ALB. L. REV. 2 1 3 ( 1 998); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning
Theory and the Teaching ofSocial Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37 ( 1 995).
53. See Kandis Scott, Clinical Essay, Non-Analytical Thinking in Law Practice: Blinking in
the Forest, 1 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 687 (2006).
54. See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, When Students Lose Perspective: Clini
cal Supervision and the Management of Empathy, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 35 (2002); Peter Margulies,
Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 605 ( 1 999).
55. See Ann Juergens, Practicing What We Teach: The Importance of Emotion and Commu
nity Connection in Law Work and Law Teaching, 1 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 4 1 3 (2005); John E.
Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into Legal Education: Strengthening
the Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. ToL . L. REV. 323 (2008).
56. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon!, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
6 1 9, 623 (2008) ("Clinical and simulation work should guide students to think critically about the
interplay of logic, psychology, and culture . . . . ); Judith L. Maute, Lawyering in the 21st Century:
A Capstone Course on the Law and Ethics of Lawyering, 5 1 ST. LoUis U. L.J. 1 29 1 (2007).
"

57. See Karen Barton et al., Authentic Fictions: Simulation, Professionalism and Legal
Learning, 1 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 143 (2007).
58. See Mary Jo Eyster, Designing and Teaching the Large Externship Clinic, 5 CLINICAL L.
REV. 347 ( 1 999); Carolyn R. Young & Barbara A. Blanco, What Students Don 't Know Will Hurt
Them: A Frank View From The Field On How To Better Prepare Our Clinic and Extemship Stu
dents, 14 CLINICAL L. REv. 1 05 (2007); see also Lisa G. Lerman, Professional and Ethical Issues in
Legal Externships: Fostering Commitment to Public Service, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2295 ( 1 999).
59. See Kathleen Coulbom Faller & Frank E. Vandervort, Interdisciplinary Clinical Teaching
of Child Welfare Practice to Law and Social Work Students: When World Views Collide, 4 1 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 1 2 1 (2007); Spencer Rand, Teaching Law Students to Practice Social Justice: An In
terdisciplinary Search for Help Through Social Work's Empowerment Approach, 1 3 CLINICAL L.
REV. 459 (2006); Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary
Education in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. REV. 3 1 9 ( 1 999).
60. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice, 1 20 HA R V. L. REV. 65, 1 1 9-22 (2006); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORD
H A M L. R E V. 1 3 1 7 , 1 320-33 (2006). Katya! maintains that there is a "need for law schools to start a
moral conversation and to encourage students to practice law in an 'ethical' manner." Katyal, supra,
at 1 2 1 .
6 1 . See Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality," 4 CLINICAL
L. REV. I ( 1 997); Thomas Shaffer, Legal Essay, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 1 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 195 ( 1 986).
62. See Melissa Harrison, Searching for Context: A Critique of Legal Education by Com
parison to Theological Education, 1 1 Tux. J. WOMEN & L. 245 (2002).
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64
63
ity, and religion in "law" converge in a moral conversation about "lawyer
65
ing." The Carnegie Foundation implicitly invites this conversation by
promoting a vision of civic professionalism inspired by renewed public re
sponsibility. 66 That vision hinges on the capacity for reflective moral
judgment acquired from ethical, legal, and social skills, and applied in
67
classrooms, clinics, and communities. Realizing the Foundation's vision of
student ethical-social development and law school-community collaboration
69
68
warrants new forms of theory/practice integration and outreach.
Critical forms of theory/practice pedagogy regularly emerge from client
and community collaborations in clinical education, often in the field of
civil rights and poverty law. Erected here, four critical frameworks stand out
7°
in affording pedagogical opportunities for curricular revision. Fundamental
to community-based clinical education, the frameworks view the law as a
social and cultural practice and look skeptically upon legal judgments as
descriptively incomplete. Moreover, the frameworks view legal reasoning as

63. See Calvin G.C. Pang, Eyeing the Circle: Finding a Place for Spirituality in a Law
School Clinic, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 241 ( 1 999); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Integrating Spiritual
Perspectives with the Law School Experience: An Essay and an Invitation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1 67 (2000).
64. See Margaret E. Montoya, Introduction, Religious Rituals and LatCrit Theorizing, 1 9
CHICANO-LATINO L . REV. 4 1 7 ( 1 998); Russell G . Pearce, Forward, The Religious Lawyering Move
ment: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 705 ( 1 998);
see also Amelia J. Uelmen, An Explicit Connection Between Faith and Justice in Catholic Legal
Education: Why Rock the Boat?, 8 1 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 92 1 (2004).

65 . See MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMAN
ISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS ( 1 98 1 ); THOMAS L. S H AFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 1 3 8 ( 1 987).
66. See Steven K. Berenson, Institutional Professionalismfor Lawyers: Realizing the Virtues
of Civic Professionalism, 1 09 W. VA. L. REv. 67 (2006) (book review) (remarking that the Founda
tion desires a resurgence of civic professionalism to challenge the dominance of technical
professionalism). See generally Mary Ann Dantuono, A Citizen Lawyer's Moral, Religious, and
Professional Responsibility for the Administration of Justice for the Poor, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
1 383 ( 1998) (noting that religion can positively impact civic obligations).
67. See Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths From
Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 ( 1 994) (endorsing scholarly clinical projects that
"would envision the clinical training student-advocates need in order to work effectively with
[community] groups"); cf Linda F. Smith, Why Clinical Programs Should Embrace Civic Engage·
ment, Service Leaming and Community Based Research, 1 0 CLINICAL L. REV. 723 (2004)
(contending that law school clinics could benefit from the community service based learning move
ment).
68. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Story, Clinical Genesis in Miami, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1 1 37
(2007). See generally Symposium, Race, Economic Justice, and Community lawyering in the New
Century, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1 82 1 (2007) (discussing community lawyering and the changing mean
ing of community).
69. See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 1 4 CLINICAL L. REv.
355 (2008); Robert Greenwald, The Role of Community-Based Clinical Legal Education in Support
ing Public Interest lawyering, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 569 (2007).
70. For prior groundwork in the practical uses of critical theory under the frameworks of
cultural studies, critical-outsider jurisprudence, pragmatism, and democratic theory, see Anthony V.
Alfieri, Essay, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 1 2 1 HARV. L. REv. 805
(2008).
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multivariable and open-ended, and cast the process of lawyering as deriving
legitimacy through client participation.
The critical view of law as a social and cultural practice arises out of
71
72
cultural studies. Essential to the critical reflection of clinical practice,
cultural studies scholarship denotes "lawyering" as an interpretive practice
applicable to multiple oral, written, and social texts in action. That interpre
tive practice locates the social reality of difference-based client and
community identity in the interwoven constructions of law, culture, and so
73
ciety seen and heard for example within the congregations of the Historic
Black Churches of West Coconut Grove. Situating client or group identity in
law, culture, and society refutes neutral claims of a natural or necessary
mode of construction in advocacy and politics. From this standpoint, neither
the socioeconomic condition of the West Grove churches nor the socio-legal
identity of their congregations is attributable to a natural or necessary racial
order. In fact, both are constructed in the interpretive and material move
ments of law, culture, and society often captured within the "lawyering"
74
process.
The critical view of legal judgments as descriptively incomplete follows
from the insights of cultural studies and additionally borrows from critical
75
outsider jurisprudence in treating identity as multifaceted and unstable.
The constituent parts of critical-outsider jurisprudence-critical race theory,
feminist theory, and queer theory-proffer identity as a shifting aggregation
of multiple categories beyond stock accounts of race, gender, sexuality, or

7 1 . See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Introduction, Beyond legal Realism ?: Cultural
Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation ofLegal Scholarship, 1 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (200 1 )
("[L]egal scholarship itself should . . . more fully embrace cultural analysis and cultural studies.").
72. Beryl Blaustone, Teaching law Stude11ts to Self-critique and to Develop Critical Clinical
Self-aware11ess in Performance, 1 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 43 (2006); Anahid Gharakhanian, ABA Sta11dard 305's "Guided Reflections": A Perfect Fit for Guided Fieldwork, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 6 1
(2007). See generally DONALD A . SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS
THINK IN ACTION ( 1 983) (exploring how nonlegal professionals solve problems based on reflection
from practice); Donald A. Schon, Educating the Reflective legal Practitio11er, 2 CLINICAL L. REV.
23 1 ( 1 995).
73. See Bill Ong Hing, Raisi11g Personal ldemificatio11 Issues of Class, Race, Eth11icity,
Ge11der, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age i11 lawyeri11g Courses, 45 S TA N. L. REV.
1 807 ( 1 993).
74. See ge11eral/y Margaret E. Johnson, An Experimelll in lmegrating Critical Theory and
Clinical Educatio11, 1 3 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL' Y & L. 1 6 1 (2005); Ann Shalleck, Theory and
Experience in Constructi11g the Relationship Between lawyer and Client: Represellling Women Who
Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. I 0 1 9 ( 1 997).
75. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race, Eth11icity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to latCrit The
ory, 85 CAL L. REV. 1 1 43, 1 1 52 ( 1 997) ("[A]ll racial identities, not least those of Mexican
Americans and Latinos/as more generally, are intelligible only as social constructions."); Imani
Perry, Cultural Studies, Critical Race Theory and Some Reflections on Methods, 50 VILL. L. REV.
9 1 5 (2005) (reflecting on "the usefulness of cultural studies to studies of race and the law"); Gerald
Torres & Katie Pace, Understanding Patriarchy as an Expression of Whiteness: Insights from the
Chicana Movement, 1 8 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 1 29 (2005) (discussing how members of one ethnic
group might identify themselves as part of another); Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence.
Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical legal Education,
I O ASIAN L.J. 65 (2003).
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76
religious faith. Acknowledging the multiple dimensions and changing
qualities of difference-based client and community identity renders "lawyer
77
ing" judgments of fact and law incomplete and partial. Applied to the
congregations of the West Grove's Historic Black Churches, this view coun
sels CEDAD's clinical students to proceed carefully in describing what they
see and hear, and to advance slowly in reaching judgments of client motiva
tion and purpose.
The critical view of legal reasoning as multivariable and open-ended
draws from outsider jurisprudence coupled with the realist caution of prag
7s
matism. Critical pragmatism contextualizes lawyer advocacy judgments
79
exposing legal reasoning as situational. Entangled in the representation of
difference-based client and community identity, those practical judgments
so
produce highly contingent, provisional outcomes. The critical impulse of
pragmatism encourages revisiting the roles, relationships, and goals of client
and community representation in order to test the validity of "lawyering"
s1
judgments in action. For CEDAD clinical students working in partnership
with the congregations of the West Grove's Historic Black Churches, this
counterintuitive encouragement produces useful reflection and self-doubt
about "lawyering" solutions, as well as ongoing experimentation in develop
ing community-based, participatory remedies.
The critical view of lawyering as legitimated through client participation
comes out of democratic theory.sz Engrafted on difference-based identity
76. See Kim Brooks & Debra Parkes, Queering Legal Education: A Project of Theoretical
Discovery, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (2004); Carolyn Grose, A Field Trip to Benetton . . . And
Beyond: Some Thoughts on "Outsider Narrative" in a law School Clinic, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 109
( 1 997); see also, Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis" to Teach Problem-Solving, 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 65 ( 1 997).
77. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and
Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901 ( 1 997); Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing
Racefrom Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 5 1 (1 994).
78. See generally Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism and Realism, 1 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 153
( 1 996) (comparing realist caution of pragmatism).
79. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL L. REV. 1 597 (1 990);
Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Commentary, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical
Legal Practice, 1 39 U. PA. L. REV. 1 0 1 9 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Daria Roithmayr, "'Easy for You to Say ": An Essay
on Outsiders, the Usefulness of Reason, and Radical Pragmatism, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939 (2003).
80. See Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Leaming About Practical Judgment
in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247 ( 1 998) (positing effective practical judgment as a means to
discern differences in client and community identity); Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching
Professiona/ Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 527 ( 1 994).
8 1 . See Alan M. Lerner, law & Lawyering in the Work Place: Building Better lawyers by
Teaching Students to Exercise Critical Judgment as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L. REv.
1 07 ( 1 999); Laurie Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflective Judgment Project, 9 CLINICAL L. REV.
623 (2003).
82. See V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who 's Listening ? Introducing Students to Client·
Centered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a Clinical Setting, 9
CLINICAL L. REv. 83, 93-96 (2002) (linking i mproved advocacy results to client participation and
empowerment). To address the breadth of community-wide economic, political, and legal chal·
lenges, problem-solving pedagogies must reach beyond the scope of individual client representation.
See Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can Chew: Strategies for Involving Students in Prob·
/em-Solving Beyond Individual Client-Representation, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 405 (2002).
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and antisubordination practice norms, democratic legal theory encourages
client participation in the "lawyering" process through community-based
collaborations inside and outside of neighborhood church congregations.
Facilitating client participation in the "lawyering" process educates clients
in rights discourse, creating opportunities for individual empowerment and
collective mobilization. 83 Empowerment and mobilization depend on educat
ing clients in "lawyering" skills and training lay advocates to represent
underserved groups and communities. 84 Civic engagement in fostering grass
roots, democratic initiatives among clients and client groups helps transform
the standard conception of the "lawyering" process as lawyer driven and
professional identity as lawyer dominant. Joining the congregations of the
West Grove's Historic B lack Churches in strategic planning about legal
political rights education and social-service capacity-building breaks away
from the standard conception of lawyer domination in community advocacy.
C. Critical Pedagogies in Community Action:

The Historic Black Church Project
The Historic Black Church project is part of the University of Miami
Law School's ongoing nine-year effort to assist Miami's economically dis
tressed West Coconut Grove community. Housed at the School's Center for
Ethics and Public Service, the project is spearheaded by the CEDAD Clinic,
a joint venture collaboration with the University's School of Architecture
and Florida Legal Services. The purpose of the project is to provide multid
isciplinary resources in education, law, and social services to underserved
low-income residents by establishing congregation-based church partner
ships through the West Grove's sixteen-church Ministerial Alliance.
Exemplifying critical pedagogies, the project combines poverty law instruc
86
tion85 and community-based skills training with student-centered ethical
and social development strategies to advance racial justice. 87

83. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESIST
ING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002); Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines That Could:
Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 469;
Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grass
roots Movementfor Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (200 1 ).
84.

Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and Social

Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 2 1 7, 250-54 (1999).

85. See JoNel Newman, Essay, Re-Conceptualizing Poverty Law Clinical Curriculum and
Legal Services Practice: The Need for Generalists, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 303, 1 3 1 8-24 (2007).

See generally Marie A. Failinger, A Home of Its Own: The Role of Poverty Law in Furthering Law
Schools ' Missions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 1 73 (2007).

Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Community
(discussing the diversity of skills
learned in a community economic development clinic); Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building
86.

See generally

Economic Development Clinic, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 45 (2002)

as a Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal
Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 445 (2002).

87. See generally Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 287 (2001);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching Ethics/Doing Justice, 73 FORDHAM L . REv. 85 1 (2004); Jon C . Dubin,
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The project entails several interrelated experiential learning m1tlatives
encompassing rights-education seminars, capacity-building workshops, and
88
oral history church archive compilations. The project's rights-education
seminars address a wide range of topics affecting the West Grove's church
congregations, including children's health, education, elder law, tenants'
89
rights, homeowner protection, crime prevention, and voting rights. The
church-based seminars afford both students and church activists the oppor
tunity to learn substantive law while integrating critical pedagogies into
classroom and community settings. Legal analysis of this kind supplies stu
dents and activists with the constitutional, statutory, and doctrinal rules
needed to engage with the world through the medium of the law.
The project's capacity-building workshops, by comparison, focus on
90
community-wide economic development and nonprofit legal compliance.
These church-based workshops offer practical-skills training in financial
management and nonprofit governance spanning a variety of substantive
areas from corporate to tax law. Learning to assist client groups and organi
zations occurs through modeling, habituation, experiment, and reflection.
Both simulated and clinical forms of modeling dictate pedagogies blending
formal legal analysis, practical habits of mind, and skills of social interac
91
tion.
In contrast, the project's ongoing assembly of oral history church ar
92
chives, and the planned establishment of a national consortium on
Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 5 1 SMU L. REV. 1 46 1 ( 1 998); Stephen Wizner, The
law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests ofJustice, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 929 (2002).

88. See generally Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional
law Curriculum Through Experiential Leaming, 5 1 J. LEGAL Enuc . 5 1 (2001 ) (describing the
benefits of experiential learning programs); James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential
Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 7 1 ( 1 996) (same).
89. The Center For Ethics and Public Service Forms an alliance with black churches in West
Coconut Grove: Partners from the Pulpit, VERITAS, http://www6.miami.edu/veritas/summer2008/nb/
nb.html (last visited Nov. 2 1 , 2008).
90. See Project Description, Community Economic Development and Design Clinic, Historic
B lack Church Project (Fall 2008) (on file with author).
9 1 . See David A. B inder & Paul Bergman, Taking lawyering Skills Training Seriously, 1 0
CLINICAL L . REV. 1 9 1 (2003); Harriet N . Katz, Evaluating the Skills Curriculum: Challenges and
Opportunities for law Schools, 59 MERCER L. REV. 909 (2008); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Desegre
gating the law School Curriculum: How to Integrate More of the Skills and Values Identified by the
MacCrate Report Into a Doctrinal Course, 3 NEV. L.J. 32 (2002).
92. The archives are compiled and stored at individual churches through a student-faculty
partnership with local schools in Coconut Grove. The oral histories of each congregation and minis
try are assembled and videotaped by high school, undergraduate, and law students. Both high school
and undergraduate students also participate in faculty supervised multimedia projects (drawing,
painting, and photography) documenting the churches in conjunction with their congregations and
affiliated youth groups. See Project Description, supra note 90. Such multimedia projects offer
partnership opportunities with university fine arts departments and law school legal writing pro
grams. Cf Rebecca A. Cochran, Legal Research and Writing Programs as Vehicles for law Student
Pro Bono Service, 8 B.U. Pus. INT. L.J. 429 ( 1 999) (proposing to use legal research and writing
programs as a means of engaging students in pro bono work). See generally Sarah O'Rourke Schrup,
The Clinical Divide: Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration Between Clinics and Legal Writing
Programs, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 301 (2007) (advocating increased communication between legal
research and writing programs and clinical programs).
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campus-church-community collaboration linking faith-inspired civic en
gagement and service learning in higher education, work to invigorate
professionalism norms of social responsibility, historical witness, and ethi
93
cal reflection. By plan, critical pedagogies stress the public purpose of the
profession. Fundamental to that purpose is the formation of professional
94
identity guided by other-regarding interests. Viewed against the backdrop
of the Historic Black Church project, both the formation and reformation of
professional identity is underway.
CONCLUSION
Joint law school-community initiatives like CEDAD's Historic Black
Church project enrich the mission of clinical education and legal education
more generally by addressing difference-based identities, contexts, and
communities through innovative theory/practice pedagogies. Both CEDAD
and the Carnegie Foundation advance these pedagogies in the hope of en
couraging "more informed scholarship and imaginative dialogue about
teaching and learning for the law" and prodding legal educators to build "a
stronger commitment to the public mission and purpose of the vocation and
the institution they have chosen to serve" (p. 19). And yet, both the Founda
tion and CEDAD falter when they overlook the relevance of critical
pedagogies in teaching students how best to engage with difference-based
identity in the context of representing communities of color. The traditions
of civic professionalism help shape that engagement. The critical pedago
gies arising out of the campus-community collaboration between CEDAD's
clinical law students and the West Grove's Historic Black Church congrega
tions help ground it in mutual faith.

93. P. 1 4; see also Peter A. Joy, Essay, The law School Clinic as a Model Ethical law Of·
fice, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 35 (2003); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the law
Office, 7 1 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605 ( 1 996).
94.

See Aoyd, supra note 28.

